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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of environmental policy on green innovation. We 
compare the incentives for green innovation in both the Cournot and Bertrand 
competition. It is shown that positive incentives for green innovation exist in both 
competition models. When environmental regulations are imposed, the effects of the 
probability of success on green innovation incentives differ between the Bertrand and 
Cournot competition. Additionally, we clarify the conditions necessary for the 
establishment of the Porter hypothesis in both competition models.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of environmental regulation on firms’ incentives 
for green innovation. This study focuses on the effects of market structure (i.e., the 
number of firms) and form of competition (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand) on incentives for 
innovation. Also, considering the probability of success of the said innovation, this study 
clarifies what kind of green innovation occurs under what kind of market situations. 
In recent years, green innovations that drastically reduce the environmental burden 
have been coveted. Environmentally-friendly technologies are desired in goal 9 
(Industry, innovation, and infrastructure) of the United Nation’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The United Nations insists on target 9.4 of the SDGs that 
states: “By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them 
sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and 
environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking 
action in accordance with their respective capabilities.” 2  For that reason, green 
innovations have to be carried out to achieve the targets. 
On the contrary, although firms develop and deploy environmentally-friendly 
technologies as a result of green innovations, and which might be desirable from a social 
welfare point of view, it is not always favorable to each firm’s profit maximization goals. 
This is because firms incur research and development (R&D) expenses in relation to 
innovations that may not succeed. Furthermore, consumers may not value innovations 
if the prices of goods rise as a result. For that reason, this study focuses on the situation 
                                                   
2 Quoted from the following website 
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=9&Target=9.4 
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in which consumers do not value the environmental performance of firms.3 In such a 
situation, firms do not intend to carry out green innovations because such innovations 
may reduce their expected profits even if the innovations succeed. It is necessary to 
analyze whether environmental regulations by the government encourages green 
innovations. Normally, environmental policies aim to correct external diseconomies. 
However, if environmental policies promote technological progress as a side effect, it can 
achieve more socially desirable outcomes. The conditions necessary to carry out green 
innovations have been analyzed in environmental economics literature so far. Many 
existing studies have used the Bertrand and Cournot models to examine what kind of 
environmental regulations (e.g., direct controls, environmental tax, and marketable 
permits) lead to green innovations and have compared their effects on social welfare. 
(e.g., Milliman and Prince, 1989; Requate, 1998; Innes and Bial, 2002; Montero 2002; 
Montero, 2002; Fischer et al., 2003; Perino and Requate, 2012; D’Amato and Dijkstra, 
2015; Cao et al., 2016; Lambertini et al., 2017). When incurring R&D costs, some green 
innovations are more likely to succeed than others. In other words, the probabilities of 
success vary widely. In existing studies, Innes and Bial (2002) consider the probability 
of success regarding green innovation. Innes and Bial (2002) analyze the effect of 
environmental policy on stochastic green innovations in a Bertrand duopoly market. 
Following their study, we introduce stochastic green innovations in our model. Moreover, 
it is assumed that the response to environmental regulations will be different 
depending on both the forms of competition and the number of competing firms. 
Montero (2002a) examined innovation incentives by using two forms of competition (i.e., 
Bertrand and Cournot). However, his study deals with a duopoly and does not take 
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 Existing studies consider the situation in which consumers value the environmental performance 
of firms (e.g., Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; André et al., 2009). 
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stochastic innovations into account. The main contribution of our study to the literature 
is that we extend an existing framework to the Bertrand and Cournot models by 
generalizing the number of firms as m .4 Moreover, we demonstrate the difference 
between different types of innovation by introducing stochastic green innovations. As a 
result, we can show that incentives for green innovations exist in both the Cournot and 
Bertrand competition. We found that under the Cournot competition, green innovation 
incentives increase even if the probability of success of innovation is 0.5  or more. On 
the contrary, under Bertrand competition model, innovation incentives always decline if 
the probability is in that range (0.5 or more). Additionally, our results are related to 
Porter’s hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) on environmental 
regulations and innovations. Our model includes a case in which green innovations 
brought about by environmental regulations can increase firms’ expected profits. We 
present established conditions for weak and strong versions of the hypothesis in the 
Cournot and Bertrand competition. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
basic model and explain the incentives for green innovation in each market structure. 
In section 3, we analyze the impact of environmental regulation levels, the probability 
of innovation success, and the number of firms on green innovation incentives. In 
section 4, we discuss the relationship between our results and the Porter hypothesis. 
Section 5 summarizes the results. 
 
2. Model 
                                                   
4
 Although our study focuses on the interaction between symmetric firms, some existing studies, 
such as Perino and Requate (2012) and Cao et al. (2016), consider a heterogeneous case. Their 
papers analyze the effect of environmental regulation on R&D investment without the uncertainty of 
abatement technology. 
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We consider a two-stage model. Here, the market is composed of m  ex-ante 
symmetric firms ( 1, 2, , )i m= ⋅⋅⋅ . In stage 1, each firm i  decides whether to conduct 
green innovations. In our model, each firm i  has to incur R&D costs ( 0)K >  when 
implementing green innovations. In stage 2, the market competition stage, each firm 
chooses either output or price to maximize profits. Therefore, the game is resolved 
through backward induction. Firms supply a homogeneous good to the market, and we 
assume that no new entry firms exist. The inverse demand function is described as 
p a Q= −  ( 0a > , 1
m
ii
Q q==∑ ), where p  is the market price of the good, iq  is the 
output of firm i  and Q  is industry output.5 In our model, two types of technology 
,j G B=  exist, while B  involves environmental damage, that is, it is Brown ( j B= ), 
and G  is environmentally-friendly technology, that is, Green ( j G= ). Firms generate 
pollution in the course of production, and the scale is set as jθ  per unit-of-output. We 
assume that 0B Gθ θ> ≥ , and the firms’ technologies are all Bθ  at the start of the 
stage1. Firm i ’s pollution emission is described as j iqθ  and we assume that 0Gθ =  
without loss of generality. Therefore, total pollution by this industry is given as 
1
m
j iiE qθ==∑  and social damage due to pollution is ( )D E , ( ' ''0, 0D D> ≥ ).6 In this 
model, we assume a constant marginal cost of firms denoted as ( 0)jc >  and firms’ 
private production costs are described as j ic q . To alleviate the environmental burden, 
                                                   
5
 This simple inverse demand function means that this article addresses the situation in which 
consumers do not value the environmental performance of firms. If consumers value their 
environmental performance, firms would have the incentive to decrease pollution voluntarily.  
6 We referred to the setting of Innes and Bial (2002). 
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the government imposes an environmental tax denoted as ( 0)t >  per unit of pollution 
emission.7 Therefore, as 0Gθ = , environmental tax on type G  firms is 0 . Let us 
assume that all firms have the opportunity to carry out green innovations. If a firm 
succeeds in carrying out green innovation, its environmental technology improves from 
Bθ  to ( 0)Gθ = . The probability of success of this innovation is (0 1)r r≤ ≤  and the 
probability of failure is 1 r− . Generally, it is thought that firms’ marginal cost would 
increase as a result of a reduction of their environmental burden. If firms’ marginal 
costs reduce as a result of their environmental conservation activities, then the firm 
would address environmental issues voluntarily. We assume that the marginal cost of 
type G  firms increase from Bc  to ( )G Bc c> . There are two cases of the magnitude 
correlation of marginal cost, which are (ⅰ ) G B Bc c tθ≤ + , (ⅱ ) G B Bc c tθ> + . In 
addition, we assume that max{ , } 0G B Ba c c tθ− + >  to guarantee the existence of 
positive demand.  
 
2.1 Without environmental regulation  
 
Let us first describe the case in which the government does not regulate 
environmental issues. In this case, if firms succeed in green innovation, their marginal 
cost will increase from Bc  to Gc . In this case, firms do not have a positive incentive to 
carry out green innovations. Therefore, in the case of the Cournot model, the expected 
profit of firm i  is given by  
                                                   
7 We assume that environmental tax t  is set at level '( )t D E= .  
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0 2( )
1
B
ic
sE
m
π ∗ = + .                                   (1) 
Where B Bs a c= − . In the Bertrand case, the expected profit of firm i  is 
0
2
0 2,
( ) 1.
2
ib B
if m
E s if mπ
∗
≥=  =
            (2) 
Therefore, in equilibrium, firms do not invest in environmental R&D (stage 1), and they 
get the expected profit expressed in equations (1) or (2) (stage 2). 
 
2.2 Environmental regulation 
 
2.2.1 Output market competition 
Next, we consider the case in which a positive environmental tax t  is imposed on 
type B  firms by the government. First, we analyze the situation in which case  (ⅰ) 
G B Bc c tθ≤ +  holds. To address the behavior of firm i  in stage 2, we consider the 
following. If all firms do not carry out green innovations in stage 1, only type B  firms 
exist in the output market. The expected profit of firm i  in the Cournot competition is 
   
1 2( ) ,
1
t
ic
sE
m
π ∗ = +                               (3) 
where t ts a c= −  and t B Bc c tθ= + . The expected profit of firm i  in the Bertrand 
competition in this case is 
1
2
0 2,
( ) 1.
2
ib t
if m
E s if mπ
∗
≥=  =
             (4) 
The expected profit is positive in the Cournot competition and 0  in the Bertrand 
competition except for the case of a monopoly.  
If firms carry out green innovation in stage 1, the resulting market will have rm  
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type G  firms and (1 )r m−  type B  firms since firms are assumed to be symmetric. 
Therefore, the objective function of firm i  in the Cournot competition model is given 
by 
                
2max max{ (1 ) },G Bic ic icE rE r Eπ π π= + −                 (5) 
where 
{ ( ( 1) (1 ) ) } ,
{ ( ( ((1 ) 1) ) } .
G G G B G
ic i G i
B G B B B
ic i t i
E a q rm q r mq c q
E a rmq q r m q c q
π
π
 = − + − + − − = − + + − − −
  
From equation (5), the equilibrium quantity in the Cournot model is given by 
(1 ) ( )
,
1
( )
,
1
G G t G
ic
B t t G
ic
s r m c cq
m
s rm c cq
m
∗
∗
+ − −= +
− −= +
                     (6) 
where ,G G t ts a c s a c= − = − . The expected profit of firm i  in the Cournot Nash 
equilibrium model is  
                        
2 (1 ) ,G Bic ic icE rE r Eπ π π∗ ∗ ∗= + −                      (7) 
where                 
2
2
(1 ) ( ){ } ,
1
( ){ } .
1
G G t G
ic
B t t G
ic
s r m c cE
m
s rm c cE
m
π
π
∗
∗
+ − − = + − − = +
                 (8) 
Next, we consider the Bertrand case. In this case, if all firms challenged the innovations 
in stage 1, the expected profit of firm i  is described as 
2max max{ (1 ) }.G Bib ib ibE rE r Eπ π π= + −           (9) 
In the Bertrand competition, if only one firm succeeds in carrying out innovations, the 
market is monopolized by that firm. If there are two or more firms that succeed in 
carrying out innovations, then they have the same minimum marginal cost, and hence, 
the firms earn 0 profits. Therefore, if there are two or more firms in the market, the 
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expected equilibrium profit is described as 
2 1 2(1 ) ( ) .
2
m G
ib
sE r rπ ∗ −= −                   (10) 
If only firm i  exists in stage 1, then the expected profit of firm i  if it carries out 
innovation is given by  
                           
2 2 2( ) (1 )( ) .
2 2
G t
ib
s sE r rπ ∗ = + −               (11) 
In this case, firm i  can continue to acquire monopoly profits even if firm i  does not 
succeed in its innovation.  
 
2.2.2 Green innovation decision-making process 
 
Here, we analyze the decision-making process of firm i  in stage 1. Firm i  invests 
in green innovation if the expected profit of carrying out innovation is larger than not 
investing in the said process. First, we consider the Cournot case. According to 
equations (3), (7), and (8), the conditions under which innovations would be carried out 
are  
2 2 2(1 ) ( ) ( ){ } (1 ){ } ( ) .
1 1 1
C G t G t t G t
i
s r m c c s rm c c s
r r K
m m m
π + − − − −∆ = + − − ≥+ + +    (12) 
Here, we are considering case (ⅰ) where 0t Gc c− > , so Ciπ∆  is greater than 0 .8 
Therefore, the region in which equation (12) holds exists. If inequality (12) is not 
satisfied, then firms choose not to innovate in stage 1. Likewise, we analyze the 
Bertrand case. According to equations (4), (10), and (11), the conditions under which 
innovations would be carried out are 
                                                   
8 2 2 2 22
1 { ( ) 2( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )( ) } 0( 1)
C
i G t t G G t t Gr s s c c r r m s s r r c c m
m
π
+ + +
∆ = − + − − − + − − ≥+ (( (((((((( ((((((  
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1 2
2 2
(1 ) ( ) 2,
2
{( ) ( ) } 1.
2 2
m G
B
i
G t
s
r r K if m
s s
r K if m
π
− − ≥ ≥∆ =  − ≥ =
               (13) 
According to equations (12) and (13), the following is obtained. In this case 0G Bs s− ≥ , 
which is derived from 0t Gc c− ≥ . Therefore, the left side of inequality in equations (12) 
and (13) is positive. 
 As a result, if equation (12) is satisfied, then the expected profit is 
2
icE Kπ ∗ − and if 
equation (13) is satisfied, then the expected profit is 
2
ibE Kπ ∗ − . However, from 
equations (12) and (13), if the probability of success is 1r = , that is, firms’ R&D 
investment always succeeds, then firms that are competing in the Cournot market can 
have positive incentives for innovations. On the contrary, firms that are competing in 
the Bertrand market ( 2m ≥ ) do not have positive incentives. In other words, in the 
Bertrand competition, innovation success has to be uncertain for firms to have positive 
incentives except for the case of monopoly. Consequently, we have the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: There are positive incentives for green innovations under both the 
Cournot and Bertrand competition if environmental regulation is imposed. On the 
contrary, if 1r =  and 2m ≥ , no firms have positive incentives for green innovation in 
the case of the Bertrand competition. 
 
Next, we analyze the case in which (ⅱ ) G B Bc c tθ> + . In this case, increased 
marginal costs due to green innovations are greater than the taxed marginal cost. 
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Therefore, no firms carry out green innovations. As a result, the expected profit of firm 
i  is given by equation (3) in the Cournot competition and equation (4) in the Bertrand 
competition. 
 
3. The effects of environmental tax, the probability of success, and the number of firms 
 
In this section, we examine the effects of environmental tax, the probability of success, 
and the number of firms on green innovation incentives. First, we analyze the effect of 
an environmental tax on green innovation incentives. The relationship between 
C
iπ∆  
and t  is given by  
2
2 {(1 ) ( 2)( ) } 0.( 1)
C
i B
t G t
r
r m m c c s
t m
π θ∂∆ = − + − + >∂ +        (14) 
Therefore, in the Cournot case, as environmental tax becomes increasingly stringent, 
firms are more likely to carry out innovation. On the contrary, in the Bertrand case, the 
relationship between equation (13) and t  is given by 
0 2,
0 1.
2
B
i
t B
if m
rs
t if m
π θ
≥∂∆ = ∂ > =
              (15) 
Therefore, in the Bertrand competition, firms’ innovation incentives are independent of 
the environmental tax level if 2m ≥ . On the contrary, if 1m = , then innovation 
incentives increase due to more stringent environmental tax. This is because if firm i  
chooses not to innovate, then increasing environmental tax will increase its marginal 
cost and reduce expected profit. From the above analysis, we immediately obtain the 
following proposition: 
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Proposition 2: Under the Cournot competition, increasing environmental tax leads to 
more innovation incentives. Under the Bertrand competition, increasing environmental 
tax leads to more innovation incentives only when 1m = .  
 
Next, we examine the effects of changing the probability of success, r , on green 
innovation incentives. In the case of the Cournot model, the relationship between 
C
iπ∆  
and r  is 
             
2 ( ) ( (1 ) ) .
1
C
G B G Bi t G
ic ic ic ic
m c c
rq r q E E
r m
π π π∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∂∆ −= − + − + −∂ +         (16) 
Equation (16) can be positive or negative. The conditions under which r  can lead to 
equation (16) being positive are given by 
10 min{ ,1}.
2 2 ( 2)( )
G t
t G
s s
r
m m c c
+≤ ≤ + + −                   (17) 
In equation (17), ( ) 2 ( 2)( )G t t Gs s m m c c+ + −  is positive as 0t Gc c− > . Within the 
interval given by equation (17), if the probability of success, r , increases, the incentives 
that a firm i  would carry out green innovation increases. The upper bound in this case 
exists within the following interval: [0.5,1] . Therefore, under the Cournot competition, 
a rise in the probability of success increases the incentives for innovations within the 
following interval: [0,0.5] . According to equation (17), the upper bound of the interval 
where the incentives for innovations increase is decreasing, and consequently, it is 
approaching the lower bound ( 0.5 ), as the number of firms increases.  
In the Bertrand model, the effect of changing the probability of success r  on green 
innovation incentives is represented as 
  2 2( ) (1 ) (1 ) 2.
2
B
mi Gs r rm if m
r
π −∂∆ = − − ≥∂         (18) 
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If 1 0rm− ≥ , then, equation (18) is greater than or equal to 0. We can rewrite 
1 0rm− ≥  as 1r m≤ , therefore, maximum value of r  is 0.5. According to equation 
(18), under the Bertrand competition model, if the probability of success rises, then the 
incentives for green innovations increase within the interval: [0,1/ ]m . In this case, 
there are more than two firms, then the upper bound in this interval is 0.5 or less. 
Therefore, under the Bertrand competition, if the probability of success is more than 0.5, 
then the incentives that a firm has to carry out innovations decrease. In addition, if the 
number of firms increases, then the incentives to carry out innovations decrease 
because 1/ m  is decreasing. Therefore, if 0.5r > , then, the incentive can increase in 
the case of the Cournot, but not in the case of the Bertrand.  
Next, the case of 1m = , the effect of changing the probability of success r  on green 
innovation incentives is given by 
2 2( ) ( ) 0 1.
2 2
B
i G ts s if m
r
π∂∆ = − > =∂        (19) 
The above results lead to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: In the Cournot case, a rise in the probability of success leads to an 
increase in the incentives for green innovations within the interval [0,0.5] . The upper 
bound of 0Ci rπ∂∆ ∂ ≥  exists within the interval [0.5,1] . On the contrary, in the 
Bertrand case, if the probability of success rises, the incentives for environmental 
innovations increase within the interval [0,1/ ]m , ( 2m ≥ ) and the upper bound of 
0Bi rπ∂∆ ∂ ≥  is 0.5or less than 0.5 . 
 
Next, we analyze the effects of the changes in the number of firms. In the Cournot case, 
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the effects of these changes are represented as 
3
2 ( ){ ( (1 ) ) } 0.( 1)
C
i t G
G t t
r c c
a rc r c s
m m
π∂∆ − −= − + − + <∂ +               (20) 
In the case of the Bertrand model, the effects of these changes are given by 
1(1 ) ln(1 ) 0 2.
B
mi r r r if m
m
π −∂∆ = − − < ≥∂              (21) 
Therefore, we immediately obtain the following proposition from equations (20) and 
(21). 
 
Proposition 4: An Increase in the number of firms reduces the incentives for green 
innovations in both the Cournot and Bertrand competition. 
 
4. Relevance to the Porter hypothesis 
 
In this section, we discuss the relationship between our results and the Porter 
hypothesis. The Porter hypothesis suggests the possibility of compatibility between 
environmental protection and firms’ competitive advantage through innovations under 
strict environmental regulations (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
Although the hypothesis raises numerous contentious issues, existing studies (e.g., 
Ambec and Barla, 2002; Greaker, 2006; Greaker and Rosendahl, 2008; André et al., 
2009; Lambertini and Tampieri, 2012; Qiu et al. 2018.) elucidated the theoretical 
mechanisms underlying the success of the Porter hypothesis. Our study can be seen as 
one of them because our analysis can explain the situation in which this hypothesis 
holds. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) classified this hypothesis into three versions: “weak,” 
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“strong,” and “narrow.”9 The weak version explains that environmental regulation 
stimulates innovation. Note that these innovation incentives will not occur unless 
environmental regulations are introduced. In our model, equations (12) and (13) 
illustrate the conditions of the weak version. Therefore, whether in the case of either 
the Cournot or Bertrand competition, there can be situations in which the weak version 
is supported. The strong version of this hypothesis calls for not only the generation of 
innovations but also increased profit. That is, the situation is such that the profits 
earned after environmental regulations are imposed are greater than the profits earned 
before such regulations are imposed. In our model, if (7) (1) K− ≥  holds, then the 
strong version is supported in the Cournot case. This condition is described as 
  
2 2 2(1 ) ( ) ( ){ } (1 ){ } ( ) .
1 1 1
G t G t t G Bs r m c c s rm c c sr r K
m m m
+ − − − −+ − − ≥+ + +     (22) 
Therefore, firms can increase their expected profit by carrying out green innovations if 
R&D cost ( 0)K >  is less than or equal to the value on the left-hand-side LHS of (22). 
Whether strong version holds depends on parameters. The conditions for (22) to be 
satisfied are stricter than (12) because the third term of LHS of (22) is the profit before 
environmental regulation ( B ts s> ).10 
Next, we analyze the situation in which the strong version is established in the case of 
the Bertrand case. If (10) (2) K− ≥  in the case of 2m ≥  and (11) (2) K− ≥  in the 
case of 1m = , then the strong version is supported. Therefore, we obtain the following 
inequality:  
                                                   
9 The narrow version is the category that shows how environmental regulations should 
be structured to promote innovation.  
10 To satisfy (22), at least the following condition {1 (1 ) }( )
, ( 0)(1 )
G B
B
r m c c
t
m rθ
+ − −> >−
 is 
required. This inequality is obtained from (1 ) ( )
1 1
G t G Bs r m c c s
m m
+ − − >+ +
. If 
(1 ) ( )
1 1
G t G Bs r m c c s
m m
+ − − ≤+ +
 is satisfied, the LHS of (22) is never positive. This means 
that in order for strong version of Porter hypothesis to be established, the 
environmental tax level must be higher than a certain positive level. 
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1 2
2 2
(1 ) ( ) 2,
2
{( ) ( ) } 1.
2 2
m G
G t
sK r r if m
s sK r if m
− ≤ − ≥ ≤ − =
            (23) 
The RHS of the two inequalities of equation (23) is positive. Therefore, we conclude that 
the strong version holds, and this condition is the same as in equation (13), that is, the 
conditions of the weak version hold.  
 
Proposition 5: If 0t Gc c− >  in the Bertrand case, there is a region of the R&D costs 
that satisfy the Porter hypothesis, and the conditions for establishment are the same for 
both the weak version and the strong version.   
 
As a result, in the Cournot case, the conditions for the establishment of both the weak 
version and the strong version are different. Whereas, the conditions for the weak 
version of the Porter hypothesis are established are equal to those of the strong version 
in the Bertrand case. This is because the profits of firms that do not innovate change 
before and after environmental regulation in the Cournot competition but remains 0  
in the Bertrand competition ( 2m ≥ ). 
In addition, in the Bertrand case, the situation in which the strong version of the 
Porter hypothesis holds in an ex-post market occurs only when one firm succeeds in 
green innovation. In other words, it is caused by changes in the market structure as a 
result of environmental regulation. In this case, the output market is monopolized by 
the firm, and the price is higher than its marginal cost. Therefore, the situation in 
which the hypothesis holds in an ex-post market is not a socially desirable one. If two or 
more firms succeed in carrying out innovations in the case of the Bertrand competition, 
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the equilibrium price is equal to their marginal cost and their technologies are Gθ , that 
is, social damage is ( ) 0GD Qθ = . In this case, we have a socially efficient state. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper analyzes the incentives for green innovations under the Cournot and 
Bertrand competition models. Several conclusions were arrived at under both the 
Cournot and Bertrand competition in relation to environmental regulations. When 
environmental regulations are imposed, there is a positive incentive for green 
innovations under both the Cournot and Bertrand competition. Although increasing 
environmental tax leads to more innovation incentives in the case of the Cournot, under 
the Bertrand competition, environmental tax leads to more innovation incentives only 
when 1m = . A rise in the probability of success of innovation always leads to an 
increase in the incentives for innovations within the interval [0,0.5]  in the case of the 
Cournot model. On the contrary, it increases within the interval [0,1/ ]m  in the case of 
the Bertrand model. In addition, in the case of the Bertrand model, the incentives 
always decline within the interval [0.5,1] . As the market becomes more competitive, 
the incentives to carry out innovations decline in both competition models. Both 
competition models have the possibility of establishing the Porter hypothesis. The 
conditions for the weak version of the Porter hypothesis are established are equal to 
those of the strong version in the case of the Bertrand model. On the contrary in the 
case of the Cournot model, they do not match. 
  This study ignores some complications that should be examined in future research. 
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Although this study treats environmental R&D costs as an exogenous variable, it 
should be analyzed by treating it as an endogenous variable. Finally, our analysis needs 
to be extended to other environmental policies besides environmental tax while also 
introducing social welfare.  
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